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1. INTRODUCTION
Within organizations the locus of a lot of knowledge produc-
tion is found in dialogue, discussion, and argument: people
expressing ideas, negotiating deals, arguing viewpoints, pur-
suing agendas and seeking common ground. The arena for
most of this production is the meetingroom. The general vis-
ible results of meetings are normally meeting minutes, and
maybe if one is lucky a list of action plans. Generally, a lot
of energy and information that has been put into the actual
outcome is never seen again. Meeting records however can
also contain recordings of meetings where the whole meeting
is captured by a number of cameras and microphones.
Smart meeting rooms have appeared at several institutions
in order to record large corpora of meeting data aiming even-
tually to build models and systems able to capture the rele-
vant content of the meeting. Once this content can be trans-
formed into information sources, one will be able to exploit
them to gain more knowledge about decision making, plan-
ning, assessment and rationale capturing [Pallotta et al.,
2005]. This content, also known as organizational memory,
can be made accessible afterwards for further study by e.g.
a browser or a summarizer. For a complete overview of how
technology can support meetings see Rienks et al. [2005].
Lisowska [2003] lists the kinds of queries people have about
records of meetings. Two main groups of questions are dis-
tinguished. The first deals with questions about the inter-
action amongst participants during a meeting. These are
questions such as: Who was in favor of the proposal from X,
Were there any objections raised to the final conclusion?, or,
Were there any other solutions debated?. The second type
deals with elements from the meeting domain itself. Ex-
amples are How long did the meeting take?, Who were the
attendees of the meeting?, or What were the issues debated,
and which problems are still unresolved?.
We are interested in finding answers to questions dealing
with agreement, disagreement, discussions, decisions and ar-
guments. We have tried to find an approach that is able to
capture the decisions of a meeting as well as the lines of
deliberated arguments. We do not want to formulate an
opinion about the contents of the argumentation, but we
do want to identify the relations and the forthcoming struc-
ture between the arguments. In this paper we introduce
the Twente Argument Schema, a diagramming model, de-
veloped in order to structure textual units by providing an
annotation enabling people as well as automatic systems to
find answers to questions related to the decision making pro-
cess.
To obtain these structures we consider (remote-control) de-
sign meetings used in the EU project AMI1 (Op den Akker
et al. [2005]) from which the transcripts are known. As de-
sign can be considered an ‘ill-structured’ or ‘wicked’ prob-
lem, the approach in a collaborative problem solving pro-
cess one encounters in these kinds of meetings is generally
through a lot of argumentative discourse [Buckingham Shum,
2003]. We have tried to identify the various functions of the
argumentative aspects of the different contributions made
by the participants and have defined labels to relate these
contributions to each other. The resulting structure pro-
vides extra insight into which issues were debated and which
statements were put forward. The schema contains labels for
transcript fragments as well as labels for relations between
these fragments. The resulting structure captures the dis-
cussions and can be aligned with models structuring argu-
ments developed by argumentation theorists (c.f. Toulmin
[1958]).
Our paper is organized as follows: First we will elaborate on
the various benefits and ways of argument diagramming in
section 2. This shows the kinds of units and relations that
are relevant to bring into the schema. Next, we show how
argumentative structures generally occur in discourse and
dialogues in Section 3. We discuss the requirements taken
into account for our own diagramming model in Section 4
and in the final section 5 we present the Twente Argument
Schema by defining its labels and the way they are to be
applied. The examples used to illustrate the schema are
mostly taken from the transcript of the AMI-FOB6 meeting,
in particular the intelligence where four participants had to
discuss which animals they considered the most intelligent:
ants, cats or cows. The transcript of this discussion can be
found in appendix I.
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2. ARGUMENT DIAGRAMMING
The primary tool currently in use to give an account of ar-
gument structure is the argument diagram. There are many
different kinds of argument diagrams. An argument dia-
gram generally provides a map or snapshot of the overall
flow and structure of the extended chain of reasoning in
a given passage of discourse containing argumentation. A
typical argument diagram gives a map of the overall struc-
ture of an extended argument. The diagram is generally a
graph containing a set of points or vertices joined by lines or
arcs. The points (nodes) are used to represent statements
and conclusions of the argument, the lines (arrows) join the
points together to represent steps of inference.
The first researcher to represent the structure of argumen-
tation by using diagrams was Beardsley [1950]. His dia-
grams consisted of numbered statements and arrows indi-
cating support relationships. Coherence between various as-
pects of the dialogue were revealed in this way. Argument
diagrams often serve as a basis for criticism and reflection
of the discussion. A related term in relation to argument
diagramming is design rationale, which is a systematic ap-
proach to layout the reasons for decisions that led to the
design of an artifact [Buckingham Shum, 1997]. Argument
diagrams can be used for various other purposes. We list
them here briefly:
• Argument diagrams provide a representation leading
to quicker cognitive comprehension, deeper understand-
ing and enhances detection of weaknesses [Schum and
Martin, 1982, Kanselaar et al., 2003].
• Argument diagrams aid the decision making process,
as an interface for communication to maintain focus,
prevent redundant information and to save time.
[Yoshimi, 2004, Veerman, 2000].
• Argument diagrams keep record and function as orga-
nizational memory.[Buckingham Shum, 1997, Pallotta
et al., 2005]
• The development of argument diagrams may teach crit-
ical thinking.[Reed and Rowe, 2001, Van Gelder, 2003]
It is obvious that they can serve very similar functions when
applied to records of meetings.
2.1 Diagramming methods
Several diagramming techniques have been developed, all
with their own goals in mind and their own ways of creation.
We discuss three of them : Wigmore’s charting method,
Toulmin’s model and the model developed for the EUCLID
project.
Wigmore’s charting method Wigmore [1931] developed
a graphical method for charting legal evidence and looks like
the traditional diagramming methods one encounters nowa-
days in logic textbooks (e.g. Govier [2005]). The purpose
of his charting mechanism is to represent proof of facts in
evidence presented on either side of a trial, to make sense of
a large body of evidence. His charts depict the arguments
that can be constructed from this body of evidence as well as
possible sources of doubt with respect to these arguments.
In his model each arrow represents an inference or a provi-
sional force. The nodes are the facts or the kinds of evidence
that are put forward. Each type of evidence has its own
shape. Circumstantial evidence is, for example, represented
by a square, whereas testimonial evidence is represented by
a circle. Furthermore there are possibilities for including
a type of relation between facts where one fact ‘explains
away the other’, whether the evidence was offered by the
defendant, or whether the fact was observed by a tribunal
or judicially admitted.
The Toulmin model In the late 1950’s Stephen Toulmin
developed a model where a schematic representation of the
procedural form of argumentation is presented [Toulmin,
1958]. Toulmin’s model is only concerned with pro argu-
mentation and the acceptability of a claim, that is to say the
role played by verbal elements in the argumentation during
the justification process.
Toulmin regards an argument as a sequence of interlinked
claims or reasons that between them establish the content
and force of the position for which someone is arguing. He
states that an argument consists of six building blocks: A
datum which is a fact or an observation, a claim related
to the datum through a rule of inference which is called a
warrant, a qualifier which expresses a degree of certainty of
a claim, a rebuttal containing the allowed exceptions and a
backing, which can be used to support a warrant.
The EUCLID Model A final model we discuss is the EU-
CLID model, a hypertext-like model of arguments developed
under the EUCLID project. This diagramming method re-
lies on the segmentation of a discussion into a series of
claims. This model is rather simple as the resulting claims
can only be related to each other by either ‘support’ or ‘re-
fute’ links [Smolensky et al., 1988].
What we see is that these diagrams all serve their own pur-
pose and show differences in application domain or level of
detail. They have one thing in common: they all have their
own labels and with these labels they structure parts of dis-
course in a way to facilitate comprehension and point out
possible flaws. As our model should be able to reveal sim-
ilar structures, not from evidence used in trials but from
meeting transcripts, we are faced with limitations. Not all
argumentation will be in favor of a particular issue, neither
will all the components as defined by the Toulmin model be
present.
We now consider some software tools that are used for ar-
gument diagramming purposes and see what we can learn
from them.
2.2 Diagramming tools
Nowadays several computer software tools are available that
are able to help with the creation of an argument diagram.
These Computer Supported Argument Visualization (CSAV)
tools or applications are designed to assist in sorting and
making sense of information and narratives found in min-
utes or other forms of discourse weaving threads of coher-
ence. Users are able to manipulate, annotate and display
the structure in various ways. Although all the tools pro-
vide means for the creation of an argument diagram they
all have their own underlying model or method with their
own set of components from which, in the end, the resulting
diagrams can be created. The components, or objects and
relations, and the rules for combining them are referred to
as the ‘representational notation’ [Suthers, 2001]. We will
now describe some features of these tools and look at their
representational notations for defining their diagrams.
Most of these tools aim to provide a means for both stu-
dents and scholars in argumentation to analyze the struc-
ture of natural argument. Araucaria [Reed and Rowe, 2001],
named after a tree, is for example such a tool. In Araucaria
argument premises are to be placed below the conclusions
and all nodes (propositions) and the connections between
them can be labelled according to their evaluation. Another
educational tool aiming to increase critical thinking is Rea-
son!able [van Gelder, 2002], which is designed to be used in
undergraduate classes. The primary objects in reason!able
are claims, reasons and objections. These components can
be used to model argument trees. In the resulting argument
trees, a ‘child’ is always evidence for or against a parent.
Similar trees can be constructed with software package such
as Athena2 and Belvedere [Suthers et al., 1995].
There are some differences between the capabilities of these
tools. Araucaria is for instance able to handle argumen-
tation schemes in a way that if a complex of propositions
is joined through a schema, the whole structure can be la-
belled and highlighted and has the ability to show counter
arguments in a shaded box linked by a horizontal line to
the proposition it counters. It is therefore also used for the
creation of a collection of arguments fitting within typical
argument schemes (Katzav et al. [2003]). In Athena, users
are able to manually assign a relevance value to the relations
and to manually evaluate the acceptability of the premises
to see how much strength a parent would derive from its chil-
dren. With Reason!able one is able to evaluate arguments
on three different levels. The strength of the arguments (on
a three level scale: no support, weak support and strong
support), the degree of confidence in their truth and inde-
pendent grounds for accepting or rejecting (e.g. because
it was stated by an authority). The Belvedere environment
allows the nodes to be labelled with labels as Principle, The-
ory, Hypothesis, Claim, Data where as in Reasonable, the
nodes can be only of type Claim.
A somewhat different tool is Compendium [Selvin et al.,
2001], which was designed as a tool to support the real time
mapping of discussions in meetings, collaborative modelling,
and the longer term management of this information as orga-
nizational memory. Another difference with the other tools
is that the resulting diagram can contain, apart from argu-
ments or conclusions, questions or issues as well as answers
or ideas that have been expressed. Furthermore decisions
can explicitly be indicated and references to external data
sources can be included such as notes and spreadsheets.
This shows some of the tools that are used to capture ar-
gument diagrams. For the schema we are developing an
annotation and visualization tool is also being constructed.
With respect to the representational notations of the tools,
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it appeared that the positive (support) and negative (re-
fute) relation between arguments are included in all of the
tools. Only in the Belvedere environment are the relations
somewhat finer grained: examples of their relation set are
support, explain, undercut, justify, conflict. Another obser-
vation is that in all of the tools, except compendium, the
main conclusion or thesis that was debated is represented as
the uppermost node.
3. ASPECTS OF A DIALOGUE
The argument diagrams discussed above visualize the struc-
ture of an argument. In many cases argument diagrams
are constructed to analyze an argument that has been ex-
pounded in a text or that has been expressed through a di-
alogue. In this case, it is even possible that statements may
be put into the diagram that were not expressed explicitly
in the text. The purpose of the schema that we present in
the next section is to annotate the statements from a text or
the utterances in a dialogue with labels that indicate their
argumentative function in the discourse or the argumenta-
tive relation that holds between them. In this sense, the
schema attempts to capture information closely related to
the kind of relations found in argument diagrams, but is in
its nature closer to a dialogue act scheme or a scheme such
as that stemming from Rhetorical Structure Theory.
Rhetorical structure theory fromMann and Thompson [1987]
provides an inventory of relations that hold between the sen-
tences (roughly speaking) in a text that account for one as-
pect of coherence: what has a sentence to do with the pre-
ceding or the following sentence. The list of relations posited
is open-ended. The set of relations is meant to be general,
though in specific genres of texts some relations are more
likely to turn up than others. Some of the relations pro-
posed in RST are: evidence, background, elaboration, con-
trast, condition, motivation, concession, restatement. Some
of these, such as evidence and concessions, will typically oc-
cur in argumentative discourse.
In the original set-up by Mann and Thompson [1987] rhetor-
ical relations are not considered to be speech acts. However,
it is clear that they are not completely unrelated. Each of
the relations could correspond to or constitute a speech act:
provide evidence, give background information, elaborate,
contrast, make a conditional statement, motivate, concede,
restate. Ascher and Lascarides [2003], use rhetorical rela-
tions to account for a range of semantic processes in lan-
guage, therefore consider rhetorical relations as speech acts
that are relational.
For establishing the kinds of speech acts we want to use
to mark the argumentative function of utterances, we have
to look at the kinds of dialogues or texts that we want to
consider. We are especially interested in dialogues where
participants discuss the pros and cons of certain solutions
to a problem, providing arguments in favor of or against
the various solutions and raising new problems. This is not
completely unlike the discussions that are modelled in the
IBIS system. The IBIS model [Kunz and Rittel, 1970] is an
approach to fit argumentation in a model in terms of issues
and their alternatives that have been proposed and accepted
by the participants. (Note that IBIS is not a graphical dia-
gramming model) It is based on the principle that the design
process for a complex problem is a conversation between the
participants who each have their own area of expertise. In
the process the problem is also called the topic. Within this
topic, speakers bring up issues. Whenever speakers have an
opinion on an issue, they can assume a position to state how
they look at the issue. To defend their opinion on the issue
they can construct arguments until the issue is settled. In
this process the participants give their opinion and judge-
ment about the topic and thus create a more structured view
of the topic and its possible solution [Conklin and Begeman,
1988].
Important conversational moves in this kind of dialog are:
raising problems, putting forward assertions (solutions), re-
tracting assertions, and putting forward arguments in favor
of or against a solution. An assertion expresses a proposition
and a form of speech indicating whether the assertor is com-
mitting to a specific position in a strong or a weak way. The
schema that we present in detail in Section 5 accounts for
the basic elements of these kinds of moves. It distinguishes
acts in which issues are raised (questions put forward) and
statements for a position that are made. It allows one to
indicate whether a statement is strong or weak. Whether
statements agree or disagree with each other can be marked
in the relations. In many cases statements are not simply in
favor or against but variations of each other: restatements,
specializations or generalizations. This is something we ac-
count for as well in our schema. Before we present some
further details, we will discuss some general issues that we
took into consideration.
4. REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR DIAGRAM-
MING MODEL
As we intended to use an external graphical representation
of argumentation, we had to decide on the representational
notation that we could use. According to Bruggen [2003] the
most important question that needs to be answered is what
the representational notation of the external representation
must contain before one starts defining this notation.
Our representation should visualize the structure of our de-
sign meeting discussions containing the contributions from
the meeting transcripts in a crisp and coherent way, such
that answers to questions asked about the meeting either fol-
low directly from the discussion schemas or can be derived
in a straight and easy manner.
Walton and Reed [2003] describe five what they call ‘desider-
ata’ for a theory of argument schemes. Although they regard
argument schemes as form of an argument (structures of in-
ference) representing common types of argumentation, the
desiderata are also relevant for models describing the compo-
nents and the relations between these components in order
to constitute an argumentation diagram and thus relevant
for our purpose.
The desiderata are:
1. Rich and sufficiently exhaustive to cover a large pro-
portion of naturally occurring argument.
2. Simple, so that it can be taught in the classroom, and
applied by students.
3. Fine-grained, so that it can be useful employed both
as normative and evaluative system.
4. Rigorous, and fully specified, so that it might be rep-
resented in a computational language.
5. Clear, so that it can be integrated with the traditional
diagramming techniques of logic textbooks.
These desiderata also hold for our schema.
The decision making process occurring in our design meet-
ings can be decomposed into several subprocesses, with mul-
tiple levels of detail. An example is the nine-step model
proposed by Schwartz [1994] which mentions the following
phases: the problem definition, the criteria definition to
evaluate the solutions, identify the root causes, generate so-
lutions, evaluate solutions, select the best solution, develop
an action plan, implement the action plan and evaluate the
the outcomes and the process. A similar decomposition is
presented by Briggs and Vreede [2001] who identify struc-
tures such as, diverge, converge, organize, elaborate, ab-
stract and evaluate. So as we want to capture the decision
process of a meeting our model should somehow be able to
incorporate these relevant aspects.
With respect to all diagramming models we studied, they
generally start with, or work towards a final ‘conclusion’.
In the domain of meeting discussions where people make
decisions, there might be no conclusion at all (e.g. due to
time constraints). We aim to capture contributions, or parts
of contributions in the nodes of the diagram that is to be
developed, regardless of whether consensus is reached. The
support and object relations with respect to issues debated
seem to be appropriate for our use.
The approach that we took was a so called ‘goal driven de-
sign’ approach. Based on the literature on argumentation
theories and argument diagramming, we started by creating
argument diagrams on a small corpus. In several rounds we
tried to reach a consensus on how to label a meeting. When
required, the representational notation was refined. The
whole process was repeated until agreement was reached on
the labels for the components. The next section describes
the resulting schema and relates it to components of the
other models described before as well as to the structural
components inherent to conversations.
5. THE TWENTE ARGUMENT SCHEMA
The Twente Argument Schema is a schema that can be used
to create argument diagrams from meeting discussion tran-
scripts. As Newman and Marshall [1991] describe, if one is
willing to make a decomposition of large and complex spaces,
a separation of issues is required that groups arguments with
respect to a particular topic they address. Therefore we
wanted our model to be suitable to capture those parts of
the meeting, containing discussions around a specific topic.
This results in possibly more than one diagram per meeting.
Following most of the diagrams studied, application results
in a tree structure with labelled nodes and edges. The nodes
of the tree contain parts of, or even complete, speaker turns
whereas the edges define the type of relation between the
nodes. A resulting argument diagram of the transcript of
appendix I can be found in appendix II.
5.1 The Nodes
The content of the nodes correspond in granularity to the
size of speech acts, resulting in most of the times in the size
of a complete utterance. If utterances contain more than
one act, they are split up into more than one node. (See
e.g. utterance 29 of Appendix 1, which is split into two
nodes (29a and 29b) in the diagram of Appendix 2). In
line with Galley et al. [2004] backchannel utterances such as
‘uhhuh’ and ‘okay’ are filtered out, since they are generally
used by listeners to indicate they are following along, and
not necessarily indicating (dis)agreement. The nodes in our
model consist of issues and statements.
In the IBIS model issues are represented as questions [Kunz
and Rittel, 1970]. This is due to the fact that issues can be
seen as utterances with a direct request for a response, in the
same way as a question is generally followed by an answer.
Fundamental questions with respect to conversational moves
are yes-no questions and why questions [Kestler, 1982]. A
yes-no question admits only two kinds of answer, be it either
supportive, or negative. A yes-no question rules out the
option ‘I don’t know’ expressing uncertainty. Another type
of question one could ask is an open question, this question
can, in contrast to, yes-No questions be answered without
the limitation of a predefined set of choices. The number of
positions participants can take thus depends on the set of
possible options enabled by the type of question or issue.
In our Schema we have defined three different labels for our
nodes to represent the issues: The ‘Open issue’, the ‘A/B
issue’ and the ‘Yes-No issue’. The open issue allows for
any number of possible replies possibly revealing positions
or options that were not considered beforehand. This in
contrast with the A/B issue, that allows participants to take
a position for a countable number of positions which should
be known from the context (c.f. ‘Would you say ants, cats or
cows?’). The yes-no issue, in line with the yes-no question
directly requests whether the participants positions agree or
disagree with the issue. The reader should note that we leave
out the why question. This is done because a why question
can be modelled as an open question with a clarification
relation, explained in the next section.
Participants’ positions are generally conveyed through the
assertion of statements. The content of a statement always
contains a proposition in which a certain property or quality
is ascribed to a person or thing. A proposition can be a
description of facts or events, a prediction, a judgement, or
an advice (Van Eemeren et al. [2002]).
Statements can vary in the degree of force and scope. It
can happen that meeting participants make remarks that
indicate that they are not sure if what they say is actually
true. Toulmin [1958] uses a qualifier in his model to say
something about the force of what he calls ‘claim’. When
this qualifier is introduced, it is possible that the assertion
is made with less force. As Eemeren [2003] points out that
the force of an argument can also be derived from lexical
cues. To be able to represent this we introduce the label
‘weak statement’.
5.2 The Relations
Relations can only exist between nodes. For this we have
defined a number of relations that can exist between the la-
belled nodes. When engaged in a discussion or debate, the
elimination of misunderstandings is a prerequisite in order to
understand each other and hence to proceed [Neass, 1966].
Participants in a discussion, according to Neass, eliminate
misunderstandings by clarifying, or specifying their state-
ments. These moves can e.g. be observed in the criteria
definition phase, of the decision making process.
If one clarifies a statement, the new contribution sheds a
different light on the same content to increase comprehen-
sion by the other party. As this occurs regularly in the dis-
cussions examined we introduced the ‘Clarification’ relation
label. It is to be noted that a clarification contribution can
also be made by a different person than the person mak-
ing the initial contribution. An example of a clarification
relation occurs between the following two contributions in
our example ‘Ants are the most intelligent animals’ and the
proceeding contribution of the same speaker shows why this
is the case ‘Ants can build big structures’. The second con-
tribution here is used to clarify the first one by explaining
why the speaker thinks that what was said by his first con-
tribution is true.
A specification occurs in situations where a question is asked
by one of the speakers and someone else asks a question
which specializes the first question resulting in a possible so-
lution space with more constraints. The contribution ‘Which
animal is the most intelligent?’ can be specialized with the
following proceeding contribution ‘Is an ant or a cow the
most intelligent animal?’ which again can be specialized if
one for instance asks ’Are ants the most intelligent animal?’.
The other way around is however also possible. If one is not
able to find a solution for the specific problem, one could
enlarge the solution space through generalization. For these
occasions we introduce the labels ‘Specialization’ and ‘Gen-
eralization’ Both labels can for instance be applied when a
particular issue generalizes or specializes another issue.
Whenever the issue is defined, an exchange of ideas about
the possible answers or possible solution naturally occurs in
the decision making process. Whenever a statement is made
as a response to an open-issue or an A/B-issue it might re-
veal something about the position of participant in the solu-
tion space. In general he provides an ‘Option’ to settle the
issue at hand. For example when a speaker asks ‘Which ani-
mal is the most intelligent?’ and the response from someone
else is ‘I think it’s an ant’ the option relation is to be applied.
The opposite of the option relation is the ‘Option-exclusion’
relation, and it is to be used whenever a contribution ex-
cludes a single option from the solution space.
For a yes/no-issue the contributions that can be made are
not related to enlarge or to reduce the solution space, but to
reveal one’s opinion to the particular solution or option at
hand. In a conversation people can have a positive, negative
or neutral stance regarding statements or Y/N-issues. For
this purpose the labels ‘Positive’, ‘Negative’ and ‘Uncertain’
are introduced. With the aim to reveal whether contribu-
tions from participants are either supportive, objective, or
unclear. We see that the positive and negative label are used
in many of the models described in section 2.1 and 2.2.
The positive relation can exist for example between a yes/no-
issue and a statement that is a positive response to the issue
or between two statements agreeing with each other. When
one speaker states that cows can be eliminated as being the
most intelligent animals and the response from another par-
ticipant is that cows don’t look very intelligent, then the
relation between these statements is positive. The negative
relation is logically the opposite of the positive relation. It
is to be applied in situations where speakers disagree with
each other or when they provide a conflicting statement as
a response to a previous statement or a negative response
to a Yes/No-issue. In a case where it is not clear whether
a contribution is positive or negative, but that there exists
some doubt on the truth value of what the first speaker said,
one should use the uncertain relation. From experience with
the annotations it appears that in most cases it can easily be
seen by the annotator whether the remark is mostly agreeing
or mostly showing doubt.
The final relation of our set is to be applied when the content
of a particular contribution is required to be able to figure
out whether another contribution can be true or not. We
named this the Subject to relation, which is somehow related
to the concession relation in Toulmin’s model. It is to be
applied for example in the situation where someone states
that ‘If you leave something in the kitchen, you’re less likely
to find a cow’ and the response is ‘That depends if the cow
is very hungry’. So the second contribution creates a prereq-
uisite that has to be known before the first contribution can
be evaluated. If the cow is very hungry the support could be
either positive or negative. The uncertain label is not to be
applied it this case, as the stance of the person in question
is clear once the prerequisite is filled in. The uncertain label
is merely to be used when an issue is preceded by a request
for specialization or clarification.
5.3 Preserving the conversational flow
As we are working on transcripts, it is best for our model
to be constructed sequentially in order to follow the line of
the discussion. To preserve the order of the discussion in
the model we decided that, when applying the schema, the
algorithm or annotator should follow a depth first search
algorithm [Cormen et al., 1990] when extending it. This
means that in principle every next contribution becomes a
child of the previous contribution, unless the current con-
tribution relates stronger to the parent of the previous con-
tribution. This way the resulting tree structure can still be
read synchronously.
5.4 Freedom of the annotator
One of the drawbacks of argument diagramming that is of-
ten mentioned is that there is no correct diagram. Walton
[1996] for instance showed that various different argument
diagrams can be instantiated by one single text. Although
this is true, an interesting point here is the analogy that can
be drawn between RST and Argument Diagramming. As
Reed and Rowe [2001] point out that Mann and Thompson
suggest that the analyst should make plausibility judgements
rather than absolute analytical decisions, it is implicated
that there can be more than one reasonable analysis. This
also goes for argument diagramming, where the evaluator is
free to interpret and to create that diagram that he considers
the most appropriate according to his or her perception. As
long as the schema is applied correctly, its purpose anyhow
will be apparent.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have developed a method to capture argumentative as-
pects of meeting discussions in a way that an argument dia-
gram can be created that shows how the discussion evolved,
how the contributions of the participants relate, which issues
were debated and which possible solutions were evaluated.
The resulting argument maps are a valuable resource captur-
ing organizational memory, that can aid querying systems
and can be used in meeting browsers.
Currently we are developing a tool to help make annotations
of meeting transcripts. This way we want to construct a cor-
pus from which models are to be trained that hopefully one
day will be able to derive the structures of the argumen-
tation themselves. When the first annotations are ready,
reliability analysis amongst annotators will be investigated
and a study into automatic recognition of both labels and
relations will be conducted. For the reliability of relational
annotations we foresee an approach similar to the one de-
scribed in Jovanovic et al. [2005] for adjacency pairs.
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8. APPENDIX I : TRANSCRIPT AMI-FOBM6
1)P2: Ants are the most intelligent animals in the world.
2)P0: Well taken as a whole maybe, but individually no
3)P2: ?? cats
4)P3: Yeah but there’s an ‘S’ VOC laugh. There is a problem here
5)P0: Well it’s a species, a species yeah
6)P3: I would say the most intelligent animal is in singular
7)P2: Which one?
8)P3: Or maybe we have to consider we have to consider intelligence as a group
maybe?
9)P0: a ?? a cat, a cow or ??
10)P1: Um
11)P3: Cause cow as a group, I would bet on cow VOC laugh.
12)P2: I think we we can eliminate cow anyway
13)P3: It doesn’t look very intelligent. You have any clue of cow intelligence?
VOC laugh
14)P0: I think they have some kind of secret manifestation of intelligence.
15)P2: Oh yes no no no no
16)P0: They hide it very well. Well you can’t because when they’re observed,
they instantly hide it. So you can’t know.
17)P3: When when they
18)P0: This was a guess I think.
19)P2: So the mother um I would rate it as ants cats, ants cats and cows
20)P0: What?
21)P2: In that in that order I’d rate them as ?? VOC laugh
22)P3: I would rate cats, cow, ants
23)P0: I would say ants.
24)P2: Ants yeah
25)P0: Yeah
26)P3: You would say ants first
27)P0: As a group
28)P2: Yeah as a group yeah
29)P3: As a group yeah but that’s not really intelligence that’s organization
30)P2: Well
31)P1: Um yeah yes um as an organization they are very intelligent
32)P2: Um the cats hardly live together, you know
33)P3: Yeah but is-t it can be a proof of intelligence if they can um they can
have um critique opinion against other cats, where as ants just agree, so they
don’t really
34)P0: Yeah
35)P0: What doe-s what does it prove? is it just
36)P1: Actually an interesting point is that ants have survise/survived o-n on
the earth for millions of years without evolution
37)P0: Well they have a very plastic if it’s English, plastic nature. They can be
modified at will the the the queen
38)P1: They can’t?
39)P3: They can
40)P0: The queen decides what she produces depending on the conditions
41)P2: That is Bees right?
42)P0: No I think it’s true for ants
43)P2: Ants also
44)P0: So
45)P1: All- all of this it true, but it this not related to intelligence.
46)P3: Yeah good a good adaptation capacity they have good group behaviour.
47)P2: but they don’t have any initiative or
48)P0: Well yeah but
49)P1: What’s intelligence?
50)P1: What I’m trying to say
51)P2: Well cats have initiative to steal food for themselves
52)P3: Yeah if you let something anywhere a cat will try to
53)P2: Ants
54)P2: Ants do have the same instinct you leave your sugar box open anywhere
they come there and they make it you know VOC laugh VOC laugh VOC laugh
55)P0: Yeah
56)P1: I-f if there’s something, an ant will eventually find it
57)P3: That’s much more difficult with a cow. VOC laugh If you leave something
in a kitchen, you are less likely to find a cow VOC laugh VOC laugh u-
58)P0: You know you are in trouble yeah?
59)P1: It depends if the cow is very hungry.
60)P2: Well cow usually, well cows usually, well I don’t know here, but in India
the cows usually have a tendency to go into an some others field to eat the green
grass if it doesn’t gets it. Well depending on the situation the cow can also
become intelligent
61)P0: ?? a mad cow maybe VOC laugh
62)P3: Ok

